Caesar, Pompey, and The Great Roman Civil War

The first century B.C. demonstrated many of the weaknesses that had formed in the Roman Republic. Civil strife became commonplace and measures to strengthen the republican government failed. A shift in power allowed ambitious generals to supersede the once dominant Senate. At the conclusion of the civil war between Sulla and Marius in the 80s, Sulla attempted to reverse this trend. He promoted legislation that strengthened the Senate and limited the power of military commanders and elected officials. Sulla’s efforts turned out to be ineffective. Less than a decade after his retirement, most of his reforms were overturned. Furthermore, the next generation of Romans once again experienced civil war.

With the utterance of a simple phrase, “The die is cast,” Gaius Julius Caesar plunged the Roman world into war and pushed the Roman Republic closer to its inevitable end. Caesar’s crossing of the Rubicon River in January 49 B.C. signified the beginning of the Great Roman Civil War. It pitted two enormously successful Roman generals and their followers against each other. After Caesar brought his army onto Italian soil, however, he was no longer considered a Roman general. The Senate deemed him an enemy of Rome. The man chosen to defend Rome against the rogue general was Caesar’s former ally, Pompey ‘the Great’. The civil war touched the lives of Roman citizens, allies, senators, soldiers, slaves, and many others. Ultimately, however, the war was between two men. Pompey and Caesar had positioned themselves at the top of Rome’s power hierarchy. When their mutually beneficial alliance collapsed, they both began to fear the other. Soon a power struggle developed that led to war. The civil war lasted for several years, but the real outcome was determined in 48 B.C. with Caesar’s victory at Pharsalus. Despite all of the supposed advantages Pompey held over his adversary, his campaign failed on many levels. The complex and difficult nature of a war against fellow Romans proved to be too much for a sick, old man. Caesar relished the challenge, and he proved to be a far superior leader and strategic commander.

Before Caesar and Pompey became adversaries, they were part of a powerful triumvirate. Caesar, Pompey, and Marcus Licinius Crassus formed a secret political alliance in 59 B.C. To strengthen the alliance, Pompey married Caesar’s daughter Julia. During Caesar’s first consulship in 59, he enacted many forms of legislation that benefited Pompey and Crassus. In order to overcome opposition and get the legislation passed, he committed numerous illegal acts. After his term ended, a five year governorship in Gaul provided him with temporary immunity from being prosecuted. The triumvirate continued to work together for six years. During that time, in 56, Pompey and Crassus became consuls. They extended Caesar’s governorship of Gaul until 48 when he would be able to legally run for consul again. He needed the second consulship to once again protect himself from any form of prosecution.

Cracks began to form in the triumvirate long before 48. The alliance had always been a marriage of convenience. Pompey, Crassus, and Caesar shared respect for each other, but there was little friendship involved. A rift between Caesar and Pompey became evident when their beloved Julia died during childbirth. Caesar tried desperately to reinforce the alliance with another marriage, but Pompey refused. This put a serious strain on their relationship. The alliance finally ended when Crassus died in a war with the Parthians. With Crassus out of the picture, suspicion and mistrust grew between Pompey and Caesar. To make matters worse, the Senate pressured Caesar to relinquish his Gaul command. His enemies wanted him to return to Rome as a private citizen and face prosecution for his past crimes. Pompey no longer felt the obligation to protect Caesar.

The Great Roman Civil War was not a civil war in the typical sense. It had little to do with opposing factions within the Roman Republic. They existed, but the war had much more to do with Pompey and Caesar’s power struggle. Christian Meier, in his extensive Caesar biography, succinctly states, “It was a conflict not of citizen against citizen, but between two generals and the armies loyal to them.” Soldiers felt more loyalty toward their general than to Rome. After all, Caesar and Pompey were the ones paying them. Regardless of the reasons for war, Roman soldiers usually followed a good leader. The civil war was no different. No high ideals were involved. Neither man was seeking great change. The war at its most basic level was a battle of egos.

Caesar did not intend to start a revolution or enact widespread reforms; he did enact reforms after the war, but those actions were secondary. He was primarily concerned with protecting his position in Roman politics. His status had grown immensely during his years in Gaul. He accumulated incredible wealth and power during his conquests. With his command in Gaul coming to an end, he risked losing all he had gained. His status as a great Roman general did not impress his enemies. Pompey, in particular, grew weary of Caesar’s achievements. His own military accomplishments had become a distant memory. Caesar’s frequent reminders of his successful conquests did little to put him at ease. With Caesar’s governorship in Spain coming to an end, Pompey feared Caesar’s power and influence would soon surpass his own.

Many of the Senators followed Pompey because they believed Caesar to be the greater threat. He appeared to have gained too much power during his conquest of Gaul. Because of this, some of the most prominent senators sought to prevent Caesar from re-entering Roman politics. Cato, along with the other senators, believed the riches Caesar gained from his conquests and his overwhelming popularity with the Roman mob made him too powerful. His request to stand for consul in absentia only heightened the Senate’s fears. The conqueror of Gaul was attempting to become consul for the second time, and this time he wanted to do so as the leader of the world’s most powerful army. Pompey helped lead the charge in preventing this. The Senate decreed that Caesar must relinquish his command or be considered an enemy of Rome. Upon hearing the Senate’s decision, Caesar led his army into Italy.

With civil war on the horizon, Pompey and his supporters had a great deal to feel confident about. Pompey entered the war with many potential advantages. He enjoyed strong support from the Senate and controlled the majority of Rome’s territories. With the exception of the Po Valley and Gaul, the Roman world was Pompey’s domain. His governorship in Spain provided him with a large army. He had a vast contingent of friends and allies in the East from which to draw support. The Mediterranean and all its accompanying seas belonged to Pompey as well. The ever important supply of corn also fell under his control. Clearly the dominant position belonged to Pompey. He became overconfident in his position though. He believed sheer numbers would win the civil war. When asked how he would stand against Caesar if it came to war, “he replied that he had only to stamp his foot, and horsemen and foot soldiers would spring out of the ground.” He failed to account for the quality of those soldiers.

Pompey’s advantages at the start of the war with Caesar were not as clear-cut as they seemed. In theory he possessed great numbers and allies. But theory does not win a war. The thousands of men he claimed to have at his disposal had yet to be consolidated. His forces outweighed those of Caesar, but they were spread too thin. He only possessed two legions in Italy, and they had both recently served under Caesar’s command in Gaul. That did little to inspire confidence in them. The civilized world that Pompey considered his domain was quite large. And contrary to what he claimed, men did not rise up from the ground to support his cause. After moving to the East, Pompey did eventually raise a large army. In Thessalonica, he managed to raise 36,000 legionaries. Most of the men had little experience in war though. Veterans were sparse in Pompey’s legions. Freshly recruited, inexperienced men filled the ranks. And their once great leader was no longer the man he used to be.

Pompey’s demeanor throughout the civil war remained questionable at best. His title, ‘the Great,’ seemed more appropriate for his adversary. Pompey lacked all the qualities that made Caesar a great military commander. Through hesitation, indecisiveness, and poor leadership, Pompey squandered all his advantages. He began with all the necessary resources to run a successful campaign, but he no longer had the drive or energy that once made him a great and victorious Roman general. Old age and illness made him weak. He no longer knew how to direct a successful military campaign. Perhaps he understood this, and that’s why he relied so heavily on superior numbers.

Strategic missteps during the civil war came quickly and they came often for Pompey. The Senate and the people of Rome believed Pompey’s assurances that Caesar could be easily defeated. Pompey’s initial confidence in easily defeating Caesar conflicted with his later strategy of abandoning Italy. This caused confusion and anger among his associates and the Senate. They began to doubt his abilities. His strategy of abandoning the entire Italian peninsula bewildered most Romans. His talk of crushing Caesar ended as soon as Caesar’s army invaded Italy. To many it seemed like a total reversal by Pompey.

It is possible that Pompey always planned to abandon Italy and take the war to the East. His overall demeanor at the start of the war suggests Italy’s low importance to him. The threat of war was high, yet Pompey made few preparations ahead of Caesar’s invasion. Even more surprising was his lethargic response to Caesar’s movements. He made no effort to reach his troops in Italy. From the onset of the war, Pompey appeared to make no effort to defend Rome. Logically one would have to assume that was his intention. He wanted to move the war to a place where he held all the advantages. His troops could easily cross the Adriatic to Greece. Once there he could call on his allies and supporters to help him build up an enormous army. Caesar, on the other hand, would have difficulty moving his army to Greece. He lacked the necessary vessels to transport his troops, much less get past Pompey’s fleet. Pompey devised a sound military strategy to defeat Caesar. Unfortunately his plan did not take into account the political repercussions or the unyielding determination of Julius Caesar.

Pompey’s decision to abandon Italy sent shockwaves through Rome and weakened his support base considerably. Many of his associates believed he had grown fearful and weak. They did not agree with or understand Pompey’s strategy. In their eyes, he was handing the Republic over to a tyrant. After fleeing the capital for Capua, the Senate began to severely criticize Pompey’s actions. The Republican forces were dwindling. He had lost countless men to Caesar and failed to levy a significant number of troops. To them the war was spiraling out of control and Caesar was winning. Pompey committed further errors by wavering in his strategy. They were already distrustful of him, but his irresolute manner only exacerbated the situation. Some men suspected that it had always been Pompey’s intention to abandon Italy. Cicero in particular questioned Pompey’s motives. In one of Cicero’s many letters to his friend Atticus, he described his concern over Pompey’s relaxed manner prior to the outbreak of war. In another letter dated February 49 B.C., Cicero discussed his suspicions that Pompey left Rome for ulterior motives. He believed Pompey wanted to follow in Sulla’s footsteps and return as the “master of Italy.”

Failure to communicate his strategies and motives properly adversely affected the outcome of the civil war for Pompey. He kept his plans secret not only from the Senate, but also from his own military commanders. They were not aware of his desire to abandon Italy until it was too late. This lack of communication had severe repercussions when Domitius decided to face Caesar in Italy. At Corfinium Domitius was confident that his legions, with the support of Pompey’s forces, could crush Caesar. Pompey refused to come, but he implored Domitius to leave Corfinium at once and meet him at Capua. Pompey wound up losing both legions as they surrendered to Caesar. This shifted the power in Italy over to Caesar. If Pompey had not already decided to move east, then he certainly did after this debacle. A similar breakdown in Pompey’s leadership occurred in Spain. Caesar was nearly defeated by the Pompeian forces led by Afranius. Just as Domitius expected Pompey to come to his aid at Corfinium, Afranius thought Pompey would come to Spain. He mistakenly relied on rumors rather than actual communiqués. Pompey refused to engage Caesar in Italy or Spain. He wanted Caesar to come to Greece. Afranius proved no match for Caesar. After overcoming initial setbacks, Caesar outmaneuvered the Pompeians and took control of Spain.

Caesar waged a drastically different war compared to Pompey. Pompey failed to take any initiative throughout the war. He immediately retreated to a defensive posture. Caesar did the exact opposite. He moved quickly and deliberately. He brought the war to his enemies. Caesar directed a campaign that frequently surprised the Pompeians. It started immediately with his quick decision to cross the Rubicon and continued throughout the civil war. In the opening year of war, Caesar’s war machine gained control of Italy, Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily. Pompey spent his time building up an inexperienced army in Greece, but doing little else.

A complex war strategy enabled Caesar to gain territories and support in a relatively short period of time. Entering the civil war, Caesar was at a great disadvantage when it came to public opinion. Romans saw him as a power hungry general turning against his own city. They feared the worst from him. He knew winning over the populace would give him some legitimacy and further his cause. Therefore he enacted a strategy vastly different from Pompey’s methods. Caesar openly sought compromise and peace. He offered widespread clemency to all neutrals and even those that opposed him. In one of Caesar’s letters, he made it clear that clemency was an important strategic move in the civil war. He hoped to sway popular support to his side. Caesar set the tone of his campaign when he pardoned all the men who surrendered at Corfinium. Caesar’s control of Rome did not lead to any proscriptions either. Instead he brought many of the remaining Senators over to his side. Pompey on the other hand rejected Caesar’s offers of peace and made it clear that widespread proscriptions would follow the war. Those who were not with Pompey were against him.

Few leaders possess the confidence and resiliency that Caesar demonstrated during the civil war. Time and time again, he found himself in dire situations that nearly ended his campaign. At one point in Spain, a disastrous flood allowed the Pompeian forces to cut him off from his supply routes. His forces were stranded and unable to cross the River Sicoris. Caesar devised an ingenious plan which allowed him to secretly transport his troops across the river without the Pompeians knowing. Caesar quickly turned on the offensive and subdued the whole of Spain. He turned his attention towards Greece and Pompey soon after. The odds still favored Pompey, but Caesar’s confidence was overwhelming. He set out for Greece despite all of the obstacles facing him. Caesar crossed the Adriatic with half his troops. Mark Antony followed soon after with the remainder of his men. The Pompeian commanders had been caught off guard by Caesar’s sudden arrival and failed to offer any resistance. The two Caesarian forces met and through strategic maneuvering placed themselves between Pompey’s army and the town of Dyrrachium. Dyrrachium at the time held the majority of Pompey’s supplies. Caesar’s advantage, however, quickly turned to disaster when he suffered his worst defeat of the war.

Caesar suffered a massive defeat at Dyrrachium. A thousand of his men were killed and Pompey believed his triumph was in sight. Rather than finishing off the Caesarians, however, he reverted back to a defensive posture. Caesar, aware of his good fortune, declared “he would have lost if only the enemy commander had known how to win.” Following the terrible defeat, Caesar reassessed his strategy and decided to move his forces further inland. He wanted to draw Pompey away from the Adriatic. Pompey followed but was unable to catch up immediately. Finally both forces lined up against each other at Pharsalus. Pompey once again failed to take an immediate offensive. He continued to delay his attack on Caesar’s smaller army.

The battle of Pharsalus demonstrated the enormous differences that existed between Caesar and Pompey. Throughout the civil war Pompey avoided facing Caesar in battle. Even when his forces greatly outnumbered his enemy, he was still reluctant to draw swords. Caesar on the other hand took the battle to Pompey and relished the thought of a decisive battle. Caesar’s confidence in his men and his own ability as a general were evident as he prepared to battle the Pompeians at Pharsalus. Pompey’s legionaries outnumbered Caesar’s almost two to one and he had a staggering seven to one advantage in cavalry. Despite these odds, Pompey showed little faith in his army. Before the battle, he ordered his men to hold their ground rather than advance against Caesar. This demonstrated the complete lack of confidence Pompey had in his men. Caesar, having supreme confidence in his veterans, devised a strategy to counter Pompey’s superior numbers. He outwitted his adversary by using a fourth line of troops to surprise the enemy cavalry. This fourth line remained hidden from sight, so Pompey assumed Caesar was using a traditional three line formation. It worked to perfection. After Pompey’s cavalry attacked Caesar’s flank, the fourth line attacked and caught the cavalry off guard. Lacking the discipline and field experience of Caesar’s veterans, the cavalry fled. This left the remainder of Pompey’s forces alone and allowed Caesar to push forward with a fierce charge. Pompey’s forces were overrun by Caesar’s legions. Pompey abandoned the remainder of his men on the field. Though the civil war continued for Caesar, this was the end of Pompey’s campaign. He had been defeated by Caesar and shortly after the battle of Pharsalus he was assassinated in Egypt.

Pharsalus eventually became known as the decisive battle of the Great Roman Civil War. Immediately following the battle Caesar’s legitimacy may have been solidified, but the final outcome of the war still remained uncertain. Pompey was still alive and his supporters controlled the Mediterranean and Africa. His status dropped significantly, but it was still within Pompey’s power to raise large armies. His assassination in Egypt finally put an end to the Pompeian cause. The victory at Pharsalus and Pompey’s subsequent death secured Caesar as the Republic’s most powerful leader. Over the next few years Caesar crushed the remaining supporters of Pompey, mostly aristocrats, and tried to consolidate his own support.

It is hard to determine where the credit belongs for Caesar’s victory. He no doubt led an impressive campaign. After all, he wielded the most experienced army in the world. They had spent a decade waging war and conquering lands. Caesar had supreme confidence in his men, and his men felt the same about him. Caesar turned out to be the superior general and he deserved the victory. But Pompey also deserved to lose the war. His strategic errors and indecisiveness allowed Caesar to run rampant. Pompey’s inaction throughout the war helped Caesar avert defeat on numerous occasions. Had Pompey been more deliberate in his actions, he may have won the civil war. Instead he wavered and opened the door for Caesar’s veterans to dismantle his inexperienced and inferior army.